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FISA SURVEILLANCE AND ALIENS 
Amit K. Chhabra* 
 
“Threats to freedom of speech, writing and action, though often trivial in 
isolation, are cumulative in their effect and, unless checked, lead to a 
general disrespect for the rights of the citizen.”1 
George Orwell 
INTRODUCTION 
The April 2013 Boston Marathon attacks, together with Edward 
Snowden’s June 2013 release of documents revealing expansive U.S. 
governmental spying practices targeting U.S. citizens,2 remind us that terror 
and governmental surveillance lurk in our midst and at times appear 
inseparable.  Small-scale strikes at the American homeland have occurred 
since the founding of our republic.  In response, the Constitution sets forth a 
treason doctrine to address domestic threats where the underlying acts are 
construed as “levying War” against the United States or in “adhering to [its] 
enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.”3  For better or worse, a fear of 
abuse allowed the doctrine to atrophy4 though repeated attempts have aimed 
 
*  Adjunct Professor, New York Law School; Visiting Professor of Law, Saint George’s 
University.  J.D., University of Notre Dame Law School; A.B., Cornell University.  I would 
like to thank my family for their love and patience, as well as participants in the September 
2013 Symposium, Citizenship, Immigration, and National Security After 9/11, 82 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2037 (2014), jointly sponsored by the Fordham Law Review and the Center on 
National Security at Fordham University School of Law.  
 1. 4 GEORGE ORWELL, IN FRONT OF YOUR NOSE 1945–1950, at 447 (Sonia Orwell & Ian 
Angus eds., 1968). 
 2. Edward Snowden, BIO., http://www.biography.com/people/edward-snowden-
21262897 (last visited May 12, 2014).  Among Snowden’s disclosures was a revelation that 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ordered governmental collection of metadata 
from internet search engines like Yahoo and Google, as well as social networking sites 
including Facebook.  The shock effect came from the fact that the disclosure was essentially 
a backdoor to rewriting the Constitution and showed that the court was now approving 
governmental requests to monitor institutions rather than merely individuals. Bill Mears & 
Halimah Abdullah, What Is the FISA Court?, CNN POL. (Jan. 17, 2014), 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/17/politics/surveillance-court/. 
 3. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3.  Along these lines, the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798 
allowed the president to detain and deport aliens from countries in open hostility to the 
United States, who were reasonably believed to be “concerned in any treasonable or secret 
machinations against the government.” Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, § 1, 1 Stat. 570, 571. 
Similarly, the Sedition Act criminalized spoken or written opposition to the government that 
evinced an intention to defame or excite in others such an opposition. Act of July 14, 1798, 
ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596, 596. 
 4. As an example, Senator Joseph McCarthy’s accusations came to be seen as 
unsubstantiated witch hunts. Dec. 2, 1954:  Anti-Communist Senator McCarthy Is 
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to better equip the government in its ability to uncover subversion.  In the 
wake of protests against the war in Vietnam and perceived leftist influence, 
for example, President Richard Nixon authorized domestic monitoring and 
surveillance.5  Congress formally legalized these activities in the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act6 (FISA) legislation.  After the September 11, 
2001, World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, Congress further 
strengthened the government’s surveillance tools by enacting the Uniting 
and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 20017 (PATRIOT Act) and issuing 
a joint resolution—the Authorization for Use of Military Force8 (AUMF)—
which legalize the president’s discretion to use military force at home and 
abroad in the so-called War on Terror.9 
Still, legislation in this regard has traditionally included a carve-out for 
the free exercise of civil liberties.10  In this vein—and in light of the 
PATRIOT Act11 and AUMF12 targeting threats to U.S. interests “both at 
home and abroad”13—we might expect our surveillance apparatus to be 
 
Condemned, LEARNING NETWORK (Dec. 2, 2011, 4:12 AM), http://learning.blogs.
nytimes.com/2011/12/02/dec-2-1954-anti-communist-senator-joseph-mccarthy-is-
condemned/.  Moreover, Whittaker Chambers abandoned his Communist allegiances and 
ultimately testified in the trial of Alger Hiss. William Fitzgibbon, The Hiss-Chambers Case:  
A Chronology Since 1934, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1949, at E8. 
 5. Mark Mazzetti & Tim Weiner, Files on Illegal Spying Show C.I.A. Skeletons from 
Cold War, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2007, at A1. 
 6. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885c). 
 7. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.). 
 8. The AUMF reads, in pertinent part: 
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against 
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or 
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of 
international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or 
persons. 
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541) (emphasis added). 
 9. Though one cannot reliably assert that certain terrorist attacks could have been 
prevented if courts had more fully developed the treason doctrine over the years, it does give 
us occasion to revisit the rationale and potential utility of a treason doctrine in light of the 
current national security focus on terrorism.  The timing of such a review is apt, as we 
recently commemorated the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of President Abraham 
Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, in which he charged several southern state 
governments of treason against the Union. Proclamation No. 17, 12 Stat. 1268 (1863).  Can a 
reinvigorated treason doctrine assist in seeking out and meting justice to homegrown 
terrorists? 
 10. For example, even the Sedition Act included an opportunity for the accused to 
present a defense that the subject of his allegedly libelous publication was true. Act of July 
14, 1798, ch. 74, § 3, 1 Stat. 596, 597.  Only an abuse of the right to free speech 
encompassing “false, scandalous and malicious writing” would be punishable, rather than all 
writings. See id. § 2. 
 11. USA PATRIOT Act § 218. 
 12. Authorization for Use of Military Force § 2. 
 13. Id. 
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uniform and not dependent upon suspect categories of discrimination such 
as alien status.14  By example, Americans after the Boston Marathon attack 
did not first ask whether the perpetrators were citizens or aliens.  Rather, 
they initially asked whether global terror was the real culprit behind the two 
known Chechen perpetrators, the Tsarnaev brothers.15  Only after it was 
determined that international terror organizations likely did not play a 
role,16 did attention then center on whether the Tsarnaevs were citizens, 
permanent residents, or alien nonresidents.  The outcome would determine 
whether the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or National Security 
Agency (NSA) could have more aggressively monitored—and potentially 
stopped them17—even in the absence of a clear nexus with international 
terrorism.18  This is because FISA, as amended by the PATRIOT Act, 
 
 14. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has specified that strict scrutiny is generally the 
appropriate standard in alienage discrimination cases, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 
375–76 (1971), it has used the rational basis test where Congress has already legislated a 
discriminatory standard against aliens as part of its plenary power in the immigration space. 
See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81–82 (1976).  A presidential order is similarly afforded 
deference in light of the executive’s traditional role in foreign affairs. Id. at 82. (“[T]he 
relationship between the United States and our alien visitors has been committed to the 
political branches of the Federal Government.”). 
 15. Boston Marathon Terror Attack Fast Facts, CNN U.S. (Apr. 14, 2014, 4:32 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/03/us/boston-marathon-terror-attack-fast-facts/. 
 16. David Crary & Denise Lavole, U.S.:  Bomb Suspects Likely Not Linked to Terror 
Groups, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Apr. 23, 2013, at A1.  By contrast, Colonel Grigory Chinturia 
of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that the prime perpetrator Tamerlan 
Tsaernev may have attended North Caucasus events sponsored by the Jamestown 
Foundation and the Kavkazsky Fund; the latter was organized “to control processes taking 
place in the North Caucasus region” following the Georgia-South Ossetia conflict, i.e., to 
encourage instability and extremism. Slain Boston Suspect Tsarnaev May Have Attended 
Terrorism Seminars in Georgia—Reports, RUSS. TODAY (Apr. 29, 2013), http://rt.com/
news/attended-acts-terror-seminars-329/.  The Jamestown Foundation has categorically 
denied any contact with the Tsarnaev brothers. See id. 
 17. Evidence indicates that the FBI received a request from Russia to review Tamerlan 
Tsarnaev and categorized him as a radical Islamist, but investigators closed his file after a 
background check showed no terrorist activity.  Later, when his YouTube page showed 
jihadist videos, his alienage status would be relevant:  a citizen or permanent resident posting 
hateful messages would presumably be protected from monitoring if the sole basis of such 
speech was the First Amendment’s freedom to express one’s opinions, whereas an alien 
would not be. See Eric Schmitt & Michael S. Schmidt, Officials Say They Didn’t Have 
Authority To Monitor Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2013, at A13.  As it turned out, 
Tamerlan Tsarnaev was a legal permanent resident, so presumably a monitoring order could 
not be obtained if it was solely based on these videos. See Julia Preston, F.B.I. Interview Led 
Homeland Security To Hold Up Citizenship for One Brother, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 21, 2013, at 
A15. 
 18. In order to make its case, the government would need to establish that a “significant 
purpose” of the surveillance sought was to monitor the tentacles of international terrorism. 
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 
291 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.) (emphasis 
added).  This might be possible even though ordinary criminal law enforcement is the 
primary motive.  Additionally, the element of terrorism could determine whether the 
Tsarnaev brothers might be apprehended and Mirandized, or be interrogated before Miranda 
warnings are provided under the “public safety” exception. See New York v. Quarles, 467 
U.S. 649, 655–56 (1984); Charlie Savage, Delayed Miranda Warning Ordered for Terror 
Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2011, at A17; see also FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS, 
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prescribes an exemption to governmental investigations of citizens and 
permanent residents acting pursuant to the First Amendment’s protections 
for free expression; there is no comparable exclusion for aliens exercising 
such rights.  Specifically, the FBI may apply for an investigation directed 
toward “obtain[ing] foreign intelligence information not concerning a 
United States person or . . . protect[ing] against international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a 
United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities 
protected by the first amendment to the Constitution.”19  In relying on a 
limited definition of “United States person” including only a citizen or 
lawful permanent resident,20 FISA draws an alienage-based distinction with 
regard to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court’s (FISC) substantive 
ability to authorize monitoring.21  On the one hand, U.S. citizens and 
permanent residents22 are protected where their actions fall exclusively 
under the First Amendment’s guarantees of freedom of speech and press; to 
lose protection, their conduct must evidence completed, current, or 
imminent criminality.23  On the other hand, noncitizen, nonpermanent 
residents24 ostensibly do not receive these protections. 
The plight of the alien in the context of governmental surveillance is thus 
particularly fragile and leads to several lines of inquiry:  Are aliens and U.S. 
persons equally entitled to constitutional safeguards, particularly with 
 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION FOR PUBLIC SAFETY AND INTELLIGENCE-
GATHERING PURPOSES OF OPERATIONAL TERRORISTS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES (2010), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/25/us/25miranda-text.html.  Moreover, if the 
Tsarnaevs were considered “unlawful combatants” they could be incarcerated indefinitely at 
Guantánamo Bay and would not have the right to counsel even if they were U.S. citizens. 
Memorandum from William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., to Members of the 
ASIL-CFR Roundtable (Dec. 12, 2002), available at http://www.cfr.org/international-
law/enemy-combatants/p5312.  As it turned out, only one brother survived the escape 
attempt, and he is a U.S. citizen who was read his Miranda rights. Alexander Abad-Santos, 
Dzhokhar Tsarnaev Is Walking, Talking and Claiming He’s Innocent, WIRE (May 30, 2013, 
4:42 PM), http://www.thewire.com/national/2013/05/dzhokhar-tsarnaev-walking-talking-
and-claiming-hes-innocent/65741/. 
 19. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (2006). 
 20. The section, in relevant part, defines a U.S. person as “a citizen of the United States, 
an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in § 1101(a)(20) of title 8).” 
Id. § 1801(i). 
 21. This is because a FISC judge’s order of approval responds to a § 1861(a)(1) 
application, which uses a restrictive definition of “U.S. person” that excludes aliens. Id. 
§ 1861(c)(1). 
 22. For convenience, this Article refers to U.S. citizens and permanent residents 
collectively as “U.S. persons.” 
 23. Section 1861(g) defines the term “minimization procedures” as those designed to 
ensure that applications for a court order minimize the retention and dissemination of 
nonpublic information concerning nonconsenting U.S. persons unless doing so is necessary 
to understand or assess foreign intelligence information. Id. § 1861(g).  It also allows for the 
retention and dissemination of information that evidences a crime that “has been, is being, or 
is about to be committed.” Id.  Thus, where the sole basis of a citizen’s conduct is the First 
Amendment, the conduct can nevertheless be the subject of information retained if it 
evidences past, current, or imminent criminal conduct. 
 24. For convenience, this Article refers to noncitizen, nonpermanent residents as 
“aliens.” 
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respect to due process25 and protections against unreasonable searches and 
seizures?26  Are First Amendment rights properly limited to U.S. persons, 
or are they essential to an alien’s liberty?  Should aliens expect such rights 
where American citizens themselves are confronted with imminent acts of 
terror in their own homeland?  Does this answer change if the danger is not 
perceived as imminent?27  In the absence of a FISA amendment that 
eliminates separate monitoring standards for U.S. persons and aliens, 
should not a “public monitoring defender” at least be appointed to minimize 
the potential for prosecutorial and judicial error by attending FISC 
proceedings on behalf of suspected targets?28  This Article concludes that 
such procedural safeguards are more effective at retaining America’s 
reputation as a beacon of liberty.  Additionally, we should learn from our 
history of depriving blacks and Japanese Americans of civil liberties on 
national security grounds;29 we should thus apply monitoring orders 
aggressively but equally to aliens without succumbing to the easy 
temptation of depriving a vulnerable group of basic civil protections. 
I.  FISA SURVEILLANCE:  PROCEDURAL CONCERNS 
Even before we consider the particularly vulnerable position of the alien 
in the context of monitoring, we see that there are many procedural 
concerns, even when citizens are targeted. 
In order for federal prosecutors to actually obtain a monitoring order, 
they must appear in an ex parte, in camera proceeding before a secret FISC 
panel of judges.30  This secrecy is seen as arising out of the “sensitive 
nature of the proceedings.”31  The ex parte nature of the proceedings means 
that neither the target of the monitoring order, nor the target’s counsel, is 
present or even aware of the proceedings.32  The presiding judge thereby 
does not have an opportunity to hear challenges to evidence presented by 
 
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Id. amend. V. 
 26. Id. amend. IV. 
 27. See supra note 20.  The historical example of Japanese internment during the Second 
World War, for example, might tend to indicate that aliens should not expect such rights; on 
the contrary, they might reasonably be entitled to fear persecution. 
 28. Along similar lines, in the aftermath of Edward Snowden’s disclosures in June 2013, 
former NSA analyst J. Kirk Wiebe has suggested that the lack of meaningful oversight of 
government spying means that both Congress and the FISC should have direct electronic 
access to the NSA’s operations. Pema Levy, NSA Metadata Surveillance:  FISA Court 
Should Directly Monitor Spying Agency, Former NSA Analyst Says, INT’L BUS. TIMES (July 
25, 2013, 2:52 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/nsa-metadata-surveillance-fisa-court-should-
directly-monitor-spying-agency-former-nsa-analyst-says.  Perhaps in recognition of the lack 
of notice for targets, the Department of Justice recently announced a change in its policy 
such that it now plans to provide notice of warrantless wiretapping. Patrick C. Toomey, In 
Reversal, DOJ Poised To Give Notice of Warrantless Wiretapping, ACLU (Oct. 
18,  2013,  5:01 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/reversal-doj-poised-give-
notice-warrantless-wiretapping. 
 29. See infra note 91. 
 30. U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE CT. R.P. 17, 30. 
 31. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. 
CENTER, http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/fisa/fisc.html (last visited May 12, 2014). 
 32. Id. 
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federal prosecutors.  Thus, any discussion here of a distinction between the 
monitoring of U.S. persons and aliens should bear in mind that neither 
group is provided an opportunity to confront accusers, even though this 
opportunity is guaranteed by the Constitution in the context of ordinary 
criminal justice cases.33 
Moreover, FISA courts have come under fire in light of perceived 
shortcomings in the application of justice reminiscent of Article I military 
courts, which are, however, constitutionally authorized.  For example, in the 
Guantánamo Bay cases, the perception of a greater likelihood of “guilty”34 
outcomes in Article I courts was encouraged by congressional legislation35 
to stymie Department of Justice (DOJ) funding for the transfer of citizens to 
the United States, and thereby to guarantee a military commission trial.36  
With respect to FISA courts, such shortcomings might potentially include a 
greater potential for error and abuse of discretion than Article III federal 
courts due to a common appointment from one chief justice37 who may 
choose like-minded judges.  This commonality may encourage and 
reinforce view polarization or amplify each judge’s political leanings, 
without a party in interest willing to present a challenge.  On the other hand, 
this arrangement might better suit a particular judge’s style of thinking by 
allowing him to focus on one subject without the distraction of conflicting 
arguments.  By this measure, any change at all could meet stiff resistance 
by FISC judges, who are arguably in the best position to appreciate the 
contours of their own judging.  Additionally, although the attorney general 
must report to Congress38 on monitoring orders that have already been 
 
 33. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 34. See Dina Temple-Raston, ‘The Terror Courts Rough Justice at Guantanamo Bay’ by 
Jess Bravin, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2013, at B7 (book review) (describing Bravin’s account 
of the Guantánamo military commission as one conceived by “a small group of Bush-era 
political appointees [that] managed to develop a parallel justice system designed to ensure a 
specific outcome”). 
 35. See, e.g., Department of Defense and Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 
2011, Pub. L. No. 112-10, § 1116, 125 Stat. 38, 106 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5496a–5496b, 
22 U.S.C. §§ 285dd–285ee). 
 36. For precisely this reason, the author along with the Federal Legislation Committee 
and the National Security Task Force of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 
sent a letter discouraging Congress from enacting section 1116 of the 2011 Full-Year 
Continuing Appropriations Act. See Letter from Samuel W. Seymour, President, N.Y.C. Bar 
Ass’n, to Harry Reid & Mitch McConnell, U.S. Senators (Dec. 15, 2010), available at 
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072024-LettertoUSSenatereSection1116re
TransferofNon-CitizenstoUS.pdf (imploring Congress to consider, among other things, the 
superior ability of Article III federal courts to efficiently dispense justice, produce 
convictions, and to do so without the taint of Article I courts’ reputation for abuse of 
discretion and reduced ability to appeal). 
 37. Doug Mataconis, Who’s in Charge of the FISA Court?  John Roberts, 
and    Apparently Just John Roberts, OUTSIDE BELTWAY (July 7, 2013), 
http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/whos-in-charge-of-the-fisa-court-john-roberts-and-
apparently-just-john-roberts/ (criticizing the FISC as polarized because only one judge is a 
Democrat, while the other ten, like Chief Justice John Roberts, are Republicans). 
 38. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
177, § 118, 120 Stat. 192, 217–18 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 21, 28, 
and 42 U.S.C.) (requiring semiannual reporting to the House Permanent Select Committee 
on Intelligence and to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, among others); 50 
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granted by the FISC, there are no checks on potential procedural abuses at 
the time that an order is requested.  However, the presence of a third party 
representing the target at the FISC hearing could help, as long as such a 
party is subject to confidentiality obligations. 
II.  MONITORING DISTINCTIONS:  U.S. PERSONS VERSUS ALIENS 
On the surface, the executive branch does not aim to differentiate 
between U.S. persons and aliens.  Rather, consistency with the Constitution 
and individual liberties is emphasized. 
Accurate and timely information about the capabilities, intentions and 
activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons and their agents is 
essential to informed decisionmaking in the areas of national defense and 
foreign relations.  Collection of such information is a priority objective 
and will be pursued in a vigorous, innovative and responsible manner that 
is consistent with the Constitution and applicable law and respectful of the 
principles upon which the United States was founded.39 
In an attempt to protect the homeland from possible hostile acts and 
foreign espionage, FISA regulates intelligence gathering even in the 
absence of a probable violation of law.40  After 9/11, the PATRIOT Act 
widened FISA’s distinction between U.S. persons, on the one hand, and 
resident aliens on the other hand.  To obtain a FISA order against a U.S. 
person, federal prosecutors must demonstrate that the target has already 
breached or is about to violate U.S. law.41  This ensures that individuals are 
not simply targeted because of their First Amendment–protected activities 
 
U.S.C. § 1807 (2006) (requiring the attorney general to transmit to the Administrative Office 
of the U.S. Court and to Congress an annual report setting forth the previous year’s total 
number of applications of orders and order extensions, as well as the number of such orders 
and extensions that were granted, modified, and denied); see also Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS, https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/#rept (last 
visited May 12, 2014) (hosting FISA Annual Reports to Congress from 1979 to 2013). 
 39. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 210 (1982).  This order was signed by 
President Ronald Reagan in 1981 and amended several times by subsequent orders, 
including most recently by President George W. Bush in 2008. Exec. Order No. 13,470, 3 
C.F.R. 218, 218 (2009).  It remains a source for determining the nature and reach of 
American intelligence gathering both domestically and abroad. 
 40. FISA surveillance is generally allowed where there is probable cause to believe that 
the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power, even if no criminal activity is 
suspected.  This follows from the statute language that allows electronic surveillance of 
either “(i) the acquisition of the contents of communications transmitted by means of 
communications used exclusively between or among foreign powers . . . [or] (ii) the 
acquisition of technical intelligence, other than the spoken communications of individuals, 
from property or premises under the open and exclusive control of a foreign power.” 50 
U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1)(A) (2006); see infra Part III.B (discussing the probable cause 
determinations that a FISC judge must make before issuing a surveillance order). 
 41. See supra note 23.  Procedures must be employed to limit the dissemination of 
nonpublic information (so-called “minimization procedures”), 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1)–(2), 
as well as to enable the capture of information “that is evidence of a crime which has been, is 
being, or is about to be committed and that is to be retained or disseminated for law 
enforcement purposes.” Id. § 1801(h)(3).  Moreover, the attorney general may “determine[] 
that the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person.” Id. 
§ 1801(h)(4). 
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including freedoms of speech, assembly, religion, and press.42  If the 
information sought involves a U.S. person, it may only be used if its 
significant purpose is to protect against espionage or international 
terrorism.43  However, the information gathering that contributes to the 
conclusion that a U.S. person is a foreign-power agent must not be 
“conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by the First 
Amendment.”44 
The alien does not receive these First Amendment protections.  Thus, 
much of what appeals to immigrants about the idea of the “land of the free 
and the home of the brave”45 remain mere ideas when they learn of 
distinctions within our surveillance apparatus.  Ordinary speech or thoughts 
expressed live or online can be used against the alien, though not against 
the U.S. person.  Rather, the alien is fully exposed to the PATRIOT Act’s 
section 218 prescription that foreign intelligence forms only a “significant 
purpose” of the surveillance sought.  By this standard, though, the primary 
purpose may be to advance an ordinary criminal investigation using FISA 
surveillance as merely a pretext for violating the Fourth Amendment’s bar 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.46  Unfortunately, the FBI’s 
ability to secretly obtain FISA court orders and also to withhold the text—
and thus rationale—of the requested monitoring from the public ensures a 
limited number of citable examples of abuse.47  Moreover, FISA court 
orders represent only a portion of government monitoring as the FBI is not 
bound to these orders and has ignored them in the past.48  Nonetheless, 
recent reports have documented 111 instances of governmental surveillance 
involving First Amendment activities across thirty-three states,49 as well as 
 
 42. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 43. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 
115 Stat. 291 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.); 
Suzanne Spaulding, Homeland Security, in JOHN NORTON MOORE & ROBERT F. TURNER, 
NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 1276 (2d ed. 2005). 
 44. Spaulding, supra note 43. 
 45. FRANCIS SCOTT KEY, THE STAR-SPANGLED BANNER (1814). 
 46. See generally Susan N. Herman, The USA PATRIOT Act and the Submajoritarian 
Fourth Amendment, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 67 (2006) (arguing that Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence should be reexamined so that the judiciary is less willing to give deference to 
legislative and executive pronouncements in order to better serve its check-and-balance 
function). 
 47. Members of Congress have voiced their frustration with this conundrum, including 
former Congressman Bob Barr, who served as Vice Chairman of the Government Reforms 
Committee:  “‘I don’t care if there were no examples so far . . . .  We can’t say we’ll let 
government have these unconstitutional powers in the Patriot Act because they will never 
use them.  Besides, who knows how many times the government has used them?  They’re 
secret searches.’” Patriot Act Divides Bush Loyalists, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2004, at A4. 
 48. Andrew P. Napolitano, Is the FISA Court Constitutional?, FOX NEWS (Sept. 26, 
2013), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2013/09/26/is-fisa-court-constitutional/ (citing the 
fact that the government has ignored the FISC’s holdings as evidence that they are merely 
advisory opinions); see also discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
 49. See ACLU, POLICING FREE SPEECH:  POLICE SURVEILLANCE AND OBSTRUCTION OF 
FIRST AMENDMENT-PROTECTED ACTIVITY 4, 15 (2010), available at https://www.aclu.org/
files/assets/policingfreespeech_20100806.pdf (surveying governmental monitoring in 
instances of simple exercises of First Amendment freedoms of speech, press, and association 
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an overrepresentation of minorities in both the criminal justice and juvenile 
delinquency systems along with a concomitant lack of planning to 
determine the source of the disparity or to address it.50  Although the bulk 
of this surveillance involves U.S. persons due to the greater likelihood of 
their civic participation in community groups, there is no indication that 
governmental practice would change merely because a target is a 
noncitizen; more likely, we can expect surveillance of the alien to be at least 
equally aggressive. 
To aggravate matters, the PATRIOT Act requires the alien to submit 
“any tangible things” demanded.51  With an infinite number of possible 
associations between an alien’s speech and an international terror 
organization’s avowed aims, ample opportunity exists for frivolous or 
unsubstantiated FBI surveillance and requests.  In effect, too much 
discretion—and too little oversight52—provides an opportunity for law 
enforcement and unaccountable FISC judges to discriminate against aliens 
if they so choose.  The cost of this distinction:  a potential evisceration of 
the Fourth Amendment’s proscription against searches and seizures for 
newcomers subject to FBI or NSA monitoring. 
 
by citizens and others).  This ACLU report cites, inter alia, the revocation of the top secret 
clearance of Moniem El-Ganayni, a naturalized U.S. citizen and Muslim American nuclear 
physicist by the Department of Energy after eighteen years of service following his public 
criticism as an imam in a mosque of the FBI’s treatment of Muslims in Pittsburgh, without 
alleging a security breach but instead questioning him about his religious beliefs and 
statements. See id. at 15.  The report also cites the stealing by the Los Angeles County 
Terrorism Early Warning Center of files revealing a federal surveillance program targeting 
Muslim communities in Southern California. See id. at 4. 
 50. See ACLU, DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONFINEMENT IN MASSACHUSETTS 
(2003),     available at https://www.aclu.org/files/FilesPDFs/dmc_report.pdf (finding 
overrepresentation of minorities at every stage in the juvenile delinquency and criminal 
justice systems and failures by the state to identify and address the causes of the disparity 
and recommending steps to remedy it). 
 51. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 
115 Stat. 291 (codified in scattered sections of 8, 15, 18, 22, 31, 42, 49, and 50 U.S.C.).  The 
previous provision was far more limited, allowing records from only common carriers, 
public accommodation facilities, physical storage facilities, and vehicle rental facilities. See 
In Brief—Access to Library Records by FISA Warrant Before and After the USA PATRIOT 
Act, AM. ASS’N L. LIBR., http://www.aallnet.org/Documents/Government-Relations/
fisachart.pdf (last visited May 12, 2014) (comparative chart).  Unsurprisingly, this expansion 
was met with stiff opposition by library advocates that previously felt targeted for foreign 
intelligence information during the Cold War. EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R40138, AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (FISA) 
EXTENDED UNTIL JUNE 1, 2015, at 10 (2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
intel/R40138.pdf. 
 52. Although the U.S. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the U.S. 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence do review electronic surveillance practice 
submitted by the attorney general that did not seek a FISC court order after the fact, this 
review does not encompass FISC court order determinations. See 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(2) 
(2006). 
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A.  Does the U.S. Constitution Permit Such a Distinction? 
Although the additional protections for U.S. persons are laudable, the 
Constitution does not exist exclusively for their benefit.  Thus, the words 
“we the people” rather than “we the citizens” are used.  Where rights are 
reserved exclusively for citizens, though, they are accordingly specified.53  
Of course, protections for U.S. persons and aliens are not identical; if that 
were the case, citizenship would not be a measurable, tangible aspiration for 
immigrants to our country.  But the Constitution is clear about the rights 
that immigrants do not receive:  the right to vote and the right to hold 
federal public office.54  Some Framers felt that newcomers, in order to have 
a say in who governs them, would first need to demonstrate their 
commitment to staying in the United States permanently and being subject 
to its laws.55  Political privileges—voting and holding federal office—could 
be reserved for those that cared enough to endure the entire naturalization 
process.56 
By analogy, international law echoes these findings:  equality of human 
and social rights are generally granted to all in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
and in a multitude of other nations’ charters.57  Under some domestic 
charters, only reservations specifically naming rights exclusively for one 
group or another are deemed legitimate.58  If practice differs from a charter, 
 
 53. Thus, the Fifteenth Amendment limits the right to vote to citizens:  “The right of 
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied.” U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 
(emphasis added).  Moreover, Article I of the Constitution requires citizenship, among other 
things, for the office of U.S. Representative and Senator:  “No Person shall be a 
Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven 
Years a Citizen of the United States. . . .  No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have 
attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States.” U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2, § 3, cl. 3 (emphasis added). 
 54. David Cole, Are Foreign Nationals Entitled to the Same Constitutional Rights As 
Citizens?, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 367, 370 (2003) (acknowledging the Constitution’s 
enumeration of “the people” throughout and reciting only the right to vote and hold federal 
elective office as reserved to “citizens”). 
 55. Alexander Hamilton, for example, opposed Thomas Jefferson’s support for open 
immigration by arguing in favor of at least five years’ residency. 8 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, 
Jefferson’s Message, in THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 291 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 
1903) (“Some reasonable term ought to be allowed to enable aliens to get rid of foreign and 
acquire American attachments; to learn the principles and imbibe the spirit of our 
government; and to admit of a probability at least, of their feeling a real interest in our 
affairs.”).  The putative concern—national security—was the stated reason for raising the 
residency period under the Naturalization Act of 1798 from five years to fourteen years, and 
the notification period of intent to acquire U.S. citizenship from three years to five years. Act 
of June 18, 1798, ch. 54, 1 Stat. 566, 566–67. 
 56. Hamilton went on to describe a phased-in naturalization process, “postponing all 
political privileges to the ultimate term.” HAMILTON, supra note 55. 
 57. Cole, supra note 54, at 372–74 (reviewing each in turn). 
 58. See id. at 374 (referencing Germany’s Basic Law that provides the freedom of 
assembly, Art. 8(1), and the freedom of movement within Germany to Germans only, Art. 
11(1)).  Similarly, the Constitution of India provides for equality before the law and equal 
protection of the laws to all persons, INDIA CONST. art. 14, but goes on to proscribe state 
discrimination only against citizens. Id. art. 15 (prohibiting state discrimination based on 
religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth); Id. art. 16 (prohibiting state discrimination in 
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then the legislature and executive are not doing their job; i.e., they are 
failing to accurately portray the Constitution under their watch.  For 
example, the American history of black segregation with courts’ complicity 
indicates that we have violated our own equal protection principles 
contained in the Fourteenth Amendment.59 
In effect, the instant distinction between First Amendment protections for 
U.S. persons and aliens would instinctively render this portion of FISA as 
amended by the PATRIOT Act unconstitutional.60  By extension, FISC-
authorized investigations that target aliens on the basis of this distinction 
are tainted as “fruit of the poisonous tree.”61  In contrast, investigations of 
U.S. persons are not tainted because they are not subjects of discrimination. 
B.  Courts and Case Law 
In order for a monitoring order to be granted, a FISA panel must find 
probable cause to believe that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a 
foreign power,62 and that the place at which the electronic surveillance is to 
be directed is being used or is about to be used by a foreign power or an 
agent of a foreign power.63  Finally, it requires a finding that the application 
meets certain minimization requirements,64 including procedures that limit 
both the acquisition of nonpublic information from nonconsenting U.S. 
persons as well as the dissemination of such information.65 
 
public employment).  Further, the Constitution of India limits rights protections only to 
citizens. Id. art. 19 (declaring that all citizens have the right to freedom of speech).  The 
Constitution of the Fifth French Republic is similar to the U.S. Constitution in enumerating 
the right to vote for citizens only. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1, and Id. amend. 
XIX, with 1958 CONST. 3 (Fr.). 
 59. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(upholding state segregation laws under the doctrine that Justice John Marshall Harlan, in his 
dissent, characterized as “separate but equal”), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483 (1954); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 60. FISA contravenes the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection for all “persons” by 
differentiating between “U.S. persons” and aliens. See Edward Lee, The Public’s Domain:  
The Evolution of Legal Restraints on the Government’s Power To Control Public Access 
Through Secrecy or Intellectual Property, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 183–84 (2003) (recognizing 
constitutional issues implicated for those targeted by the Bush Administration’s post-9/l1 
secret arrest and detention practices); The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
(FISA), JUST. INFO. SHARING:  U.S. DEPARTMENT JUST. OFF. JUST. PROGRAMS (Sept. 19, 
2013), http://it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area=privacy&page=1286 (acknowledging a distinction 
in surveillance standards for U.S. persons and others).  This does not mean to suggest, 
however, that an action can easily be brought by a target. See Lee, supra, at 201 (“[I]t is 
difficult to see how an affected party could challenge an illegal search if the search is kept 
entirely secret.”); see also discussion infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the rational basis test as 
employed in equal protection challenges). 
 61. Although the “poisonous fruit” doctrine applies in the ordinary criminal investigative 
context, not in the federal surveillance context, the concept is similar. See Nardone v. United 
States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1966). 
 62. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A) (2006). 
 63. Id. § 1805(a)(3)(B). 
 64. Id. § 1805(a)(4). 
 65. Id. § 1801(h). 
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1.  Advisory Opinions 
The very existence of FISA courts has even been charged per se 
unconstitutional, because they do not preside over an actual case or 
controversy.66  Similarly, judicially prescribed prudential standards bar 
advisory opinions.67  In this regard, a holding by the FISC as to whether 
foreign intelligence amounts to “a significant purpose” of a surveillance 
request would appear to be barred, especially in the absence of any 
confrontation by the target or its attorney.68  Under such circumstances, 
there is no actual case or controversy before the court because only one 
party knows that there is a dispute.69  Even more amazingly, the 
government can choose to ignore the FISC’s judgment;70 this lends 
credence to the suspicion that FISA courts are merely providing advisory 
opinions.71  Although these opinions do admittedly have teeth—the 
government can turn to the FISC’s unpublished opinion as evidence of its 
authorization—it can apparently choose to ignore the FISC determination.  
Along these lines, FISC Judge George Hart has opined that his court lacked 
jurisdiction over an order requesting a physical search;72 this would appear 
to bolster the general claim that the FISA courts provide advisory opinions 
that the DOJ can ignore and are therefore unconstitutional. 
2.  Procedural Concern:  A Limited Check on Executive Overreach 
How have FISA courts treated the subject of governmental surveillance?  
Although most FISC proceedings are not shared with the public, it is 
possible to discern some ways that the FISC courts have ruled.  The Foreign 
 
 66. Napolitano, supra note 48; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 67. See generally Comment, The Advisory Opinion and the United States Supreme 
Court, 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 94 (1936) (chronicling a long history of advisory-opinion 
resistance arising from separation-of-powers principles). 
 68. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 69. Napolitano, supra note 48.  By contrast, ex parte hearings in ordinary criminal or 
civil proceedings are one-sided. See Conor Clarke, Is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court Really a Rubber Stamp?  Ex Parte Proceedings and the FISC Win Rate, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 125, 132 (2014) (contending that ex parte hearings are “in tension with basic 
norms of due process— the right to notice, to a hearing, to confront adversaries”); Lee, supra 
note 60, at 202 (stating that ex parte procedures reduce the scope of information in the public 
domain related to governmental conduct). 
 70. This is apparently possible, in light of the DOJ’s recent response to a FISC order to 
make one of its own recent PATRIOT Act § 215 rulings public; the response was essentially 
no, to which the FISC merely asked the DOJ to better explain itself. See FISA Court Tells 
the DOJ That It Needs To Explain Why It’s Ignoring Order To Declassify Surveillance 
Opinion, TECHDIRT (Nov. 20, 2013, 3:47 PM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20131120/
10544925304/fisa-court-tells-doj-that-it-needs-to-explain-why-its-ignoring-order-to-
declassify-surveillance-opinion.shtml (quoting the DOJ as saying that “‘[a]fter careful 
review of the Opinion by senior intelligence officials and the U.S. Department of Justice, the 
Executive Branch has determined that the Opinion should be withheld in full and a public 
version of the Opinion cannot be provided’”). 
 71. Napolitano, supra note 48. 
 72. In re Application of the United States for an Order Authorizing the Physical Search 
of Non-residential Premises and Personal Property (FISA Ct., June 11, 1981), reprinted in S. 
REP. NO. 97-280, at 16, 18–19 (1981). 
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Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR) affirmatively stated that 
FISA does not limit the executive’s preemptive foreign intelligence power 
of conducting warrantless searches.73  With regard to the nature and 
effectiveness of procedural safeguards between prosecutorial and 
investigative discretion and the right of Americans to be free from 
unreasonable intrusions upon their liberty, the lesson appears to be that 
there is little in the way of checking executive overreach except the FISC 
and FISCR themselves. 
In this regard, the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. U.S. District 
Court74 built upon the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of “unreasonable 
searches and seizures,” discussing warrants issued only upon a showing of 
probable cause,75 the concept of a “reasonable expectation of privacy,”76 
and the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act’s provisions related to 
electronic surveillance.77  In weighing the president’s obligation to 
“preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States”78 
against the perennial fear that the president could use this power to declare 
any arbitrary group to be a “clear and present danger,”79 the Court 
determined that 
those charged with this investigative and prosecutorial duty should not be 
the sole judges of when to utilize constitutionally sensitive means in 
pursuing their tasks.  The historical judgment, which the Fourth 
Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed executive discretion may yield 
too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook 
potential invasions of privacy and protected speech.80 
The Court thus squarely concluded that Fourth Amendment concerns 
would be satisfied where court approval was obtained before the 
surveillance of domestic targets is initiated.81  A warrant exception for 
domestic surveillance purposes was thereby effectively denied.  The lesson:  
 
 73. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 742 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
 74. 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 302 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)). 
 77. Id. (citing Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2511(3)).  The Court concluded that nothing in the Omnibus Act conferred any additional 
powers to the president beyond those already enumerated by the Constitution; rather, it was 
effective in clarifying that existing presidential powers could not be usurped by the Omnibus 
Act or other congressional legislation. 
 78. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.  As an example of the president’s power to mete out justice 
upon traitors, Professor Michael Paulsen points out that President Lincoln issued a decree in 
punishment of Confederate soldiers that executed captured black Union soldiers in violation 
of the jus in bello, or international humanitarian law. Order No. 252 (July 30, 1863) (“Order 
of Retaliation”), reprinted in OUR CONSTITUTION:  LANDMARK INTERPRETATIONS OF 
AMERICA’S GOVERNING DOCUMENT 115, 115–16 (Michael Paulsen ed., 2012).  Although the 
Order of Retaliation effectively served as a proscribed bill of attainder, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 
9, cl. 3, it was not opposed; perhaps this was because Lincoln and the Union never actually 
ordered or intended to order any executions. 
 79. U.S. Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. at 314 (quoting 114 CONG. REC. 14750 (1968)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 80. Id. at 317. 
 81. Id. at 323–24. 
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advanced court approval would be necessary before investigators could 
monitor their target.  Again, only the court stands in the way of potential 
executive overreach. Of course, this case was decided before FISA was 
passed; as we know, FISA does not require a warrant in advance of 
surveillance but does authorize FISC review of order requests.82 
3.  The Substantive Test:  Rational Basis 
After FISA’s enactment, the Second Circuit found that it strikes “an 
appropriate balance between the individual’s interest in privacy and the 
government’s need to obtain foreign intelligence information, and that 
FISA does not violate the probable cause requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment.”83  Moreover, it affirmed FISA’s distinction between U.S. 
persons and aliens on national security grounds.  “Although both the Fourth 
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause afford protection to all aliens, 
nothing in either provision prevents Congress from adopting standards and 
procedures that are more beneficial to United States citizens and resident 
aliens than to nonresident aliens, so long as the differences are 
reasonable.”84  In this regard, the court recognized that it was appropriate 
for the political branches of government to determine these standards in 
light of their effect on foreign relations.85  Minimal scrutiny would thus be 
given to alienage-based distinctions.  The rational basis cited by the court 
was the greater likelihood that aliens are more likely to be engaged in 
FISA-proscribed activities than U.S. persons, as well as the practical need 
for the government to act more quickly where the target is less likely to stay 
in the country permanently.86  Similarly, the Eastern District of Virginia 
upheld FISA in rejecting due process, equal protection, Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment challenges.87 
III.  PRESCRIPTIONS 
Under current law, the DOJ has too much discretion to obtain monitoring 
orders and is free to ignore orders with which it disagrees.88  This simple 
fact flies in the face of the textual reality that aliens are entitled to the same 
rights as U.S. persons, except for the rights to vote and hold federal elective 
office.89  Though Congress restricts the definition of U.S. person under the 
immigration law, there is no support in the Constitution itself for this 
disparate treatment.90  This deprivation of basic civil rights for aliens is 
reminiscent of our historic deprivation of rights to specific groups, 
including blacks and Japanese Americans.  Those intrusions upon liberty 
 
 82. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(b) (2006). 
 83. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 74 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 84. Id. at 74. 
 85. Id. at 76. 
 86. Id. 
 87. United States v. Nicholson, 955 F. Supp. 588, 592 (E.D. Va. 1997). 
 88. See supra note 73; discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
 89. See supra note 54. 
 90. See supra notes 20–21. 
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were often similarly justified at the time on national security grounds.91  In 
retrospect, they have been lamented as deplorable facts of our history.  We 
should not repeat these unfortunate mistakes only because aliens are 
vulnerable to our laws.  Instead, America can remain a beacon of liberty if it 
more aggressively uses monitoring orders with appropriate safeguards and 
equally applies its laws to protecting its residents—both aliens and U.S. 
persons—alike. 
In order to bridge these imbalances, the institution of an Office of the 
Public Monitoring Defender (PMD) could provide some assurance that the 
potentially arbitrary, one-sided, or polarized views of federal prosecutors 
and designated judges would not go unchecked.92  Such an office could 
prove useful in safeguarding the especially vulnerable rights of aliens that 
are the subject of monitoring orders and could balance the prosecution’s 
choice of evidence presented and legal theories advanced.93  In this way, 
U.S. persons and aliens alike can benefit from one more person objecting to 
governmental and investigative arbitrariness.  Such an individual could be 
appointed by the president—as reflective of the attorney general’s similar 
executive appointment—with the advice and consent of the Senate.  Though 
this would certainly not provide as robust a safeguarding function as the 
 
 91. Just as immigration laws sought to require a period of residency during which a new 
resident could lose foreign attachments and gain a genuine interest in American affairs, 
similar arguments advocated relocating Japanese Americans during the Second World War 
based on suspicions that they might retain their allegiance to Japan.  President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt, for example, authorized the creation of military zones that were used in 
Japanese internment because “successful prosecution of the war requires every possible 
protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense material, national-
defense premises, and national-defense utilities.” Exec. Order No. 9,066, 3 C.F.R. 1092, 
1092–93 (Cum. Supp. 1938).  Similarly, southern defenders of the institution of slavery 
before the Civil War argued, among other things, that a sudden abolition of slavery would 
cause widespread unemployment and chaos, thereby leading to anarchy and an end to 
southern affluence. The Peculiar Institution:  The Southern Argument for Slavery, US 
HISTORY.ORG, http://www.ushistory.org/us/27f.asp (last visited May 12, 2014). 
 92. President Barack Obama recently adopted a recommendation along these lines in an 
address on NSA surveillance, in which he mentioned his intention to seek congressional 
authorization for a “panel of advocates.” President Barack Obama, Remarks by 
the   President   on Review of Signals Intelligence (Jan. 17, 2014), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/remarks-president-review-signals-
intelligence; see also Shane Harris, NSA Surveillance Will Change. Just Not Very Much., 
FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/01/17/
nsa_surveisurvei_will_change_just_not_very_much.  Unfortunately, he did not also 
introduce measures to ensure the FBI would not simply sidestep the FISC and conduct 
surveillance anyway. 
 93. A similar suggestion is for the adversarial input to come from the DOJ’s National 
Security Division, whose Oversight Section could oppose the government’s requests for an 
order either at the outset or submit a motion to suppress an order that the FISC has already 
approved. Orin Kerr, A Proposal To Reform FISA Court Decisionmaking, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (July 8, 2013, 1:12 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2013/07/08/a-proposal-to-
reform-fisa-court-decisionmaking/.  The president’s own Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board has alternatively suggested this role for a private group of lawyers. Megan 
Gates, Privacy and Civil Liberties Board Chair Discusses Reform, SECURITY MGMT. (Feb. 
20, 2014), http://www.securitymanagement.com/news/privacy-and-civil-liberties-board-
chair-discusses-reform-0013174.  The sharing of sensitive information would likely 
necessitate security clearances for these private lawyers. See id. 
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Sixth Amendment’s right to confrontation for the accused, it would help to 
unveil the shroud of secrecy that is often claimed as essential to avoid a 
target’s flight or early deployment of destructive plans. 
In order to act effectively, the PMD would need to be empowered to 
oppose FBI requests for court orders.  Thus, the FISC panel’s rules must be 
amended to require the consideration of the PMD’s objections and 
proposals in its delivery of justice.  Moreover, the PMD must be provided 
an appropriation for the funding of staff so that it can properly conduct legal 
research, hire experts, and develop necessary arguments.  To avoid an FBI 
work-around to confronting the PMD, the president would also need to 
amend his authorization to the attorney general so as to designate the FISC 
as the exclusive forum for seeking orders and specifying FISC orders as a 
prerequisite to monitoring.  To ensure that the envisaged confrontation is 
meaningful, the PMD would need to be independent of the attorney 
general’s office.  Thus, President Barack Obama’s suggestion of a “panel of 
advocates” would not go far enough, as it would perpetuate the present one-
sided structure.  This is because non-meaningful confrontation is really no 
representation; such was the principle in Gideon v. Wainwright94 that 
extended the Sixth Amendment’s mandate of counsel for the accused in 
federal courts to state courts.  The principle of confrontation need not be 
compromised merely because the accused in the national security context is 
not aware of his surveillance; the PMD as envisaged would certainly 
become aware of the surveillance. 
This foundation could set in motion the administration of justice as we 
have come to know it in public courts.  Indeed, our standards in the national 
security context should be just as high.  Though we cannot require the same 
level of transparency as public courts, we must not allow the FISC’s need 
for secrecy to be a mere excuse for evading principles in our Constitution 
such as a meaningful defense.  As the FISC panel is obligated to obey the 
Constitution, this is the appropriate forum for the PMD to raise an equal 
protection and due process challenge to governmental monitoring of an 
alien on terms different from those of a U.S. person.  The FISC panel can 
determine whether the statute defining U.S. persons as citizens and 
permanent residents is constitutional for purposes of a First Amendment 
challenge.  By extension, similar changes should be adopted by the FISCR 
to ensure a meaningful defense in that forum as well. 
Moreover, in light of porous borders and the reality of our interconnected 
world, we need to rethink the artificial distinction between allowing First 
Amendment rights in the monitoring context for U.S. persons but not for 
aliens.  We must remind ourselves that such universal rights form the core 
of our freedoms.  From the time of the pilgrims escaping religious 
persecution in seventeenth-century England, to our current age where 
Afghani Hindus come to our ports seeking the opportunity to live without 
fear of Taliban attacks due to their beliefs, freedom of conscience and 
 
 94. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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freedom to speak one’s mind without harming others fuels American 
innovation and independent thinking. 
Or are we willing to take the bait and target that which makes us 
American—our immigrants coming from around the world—in this age of 
terror?  On 9/11, hijackers set out to symbolically attack what America 
stands for:  a culture of professionalism where immigrants and citizens alike 
can come to work in a variety of occupations, learn together, and love one 
another.95  If we continue to respond to terror by sacrificing these most 
precious American values, then perhaps the terrorists have succeeded in 
challenging our American dream.  We can successfully resist challenges to 
our liberty if a party with a vested interest—such as a public monitoring 
defender—stands watch over our cherished diversity. 
 
 
 95. As a former Morgan Stanley Dean Witter employee on the seventy-second floor of 
the second tower, the author can attest to World Trade Center employees’ camaraderie 
across companies, especially as evidenced in the common dining room and in the Windows 
on the World restaurant.  In recognition of Windows on the World’s diverse staff, former 
employees opened a new restaurant called Colors in honor of their fallen colleagues. 
